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1 INTRODUCTION 
The Africa regional overview 2003 prepared by Amnesty International 
presented a gloomy picture of the human rights situation in the region; 
widespread armed conflict, repression of civil and political rights, violence 
against women, failure to deliver justice to the most vulnerable in society.' 
However, there have been positive developments, such as the indictment 
of the then Liberian President Charles Taylor by the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, which defy the culture of impunity in Africa. Despite continu-
ing human rights violations and human suffering, a culture of human 
rights is slowly developing in Africa. The gradual development of a human 
rights jurisprudence by the African Commission of Human and People's 
Rights (the Commission) is a good example. The Commission is man-
dated, under article 45, to ensure the protection and promotion of human 
and peoples' rights in accordance with the present Charter. 2 
This article deals with the communications decided by the Commission 
in 2003. There were 14 communications in total before the Commission, 
including six cases that were deemed inadmissible. Two files were 
deemed inadmissible because of the withdrawal of the complaint,' one 
due to loss of contact with the complainant: and three due to the non-
exhaustion of local remedies. 5 Substantive rights considered in admissible 
* The authors would like to thank Professor Frans Viljoen and Magnus Killander for their 
comments on an earlier version of the article. 
I Africa regional overview (2003) Amnesty International available at www.amnesty 
orglrepon2004 
2 Art 45 of the African Charter provides the functions of the Commission. 
3 Arab organisation.for human rights v Egypt (2003) AHRLR 69 (ACHPR 2003); Intenghts v 
Egypt (2003) AHRLR 72 (ACHPR 2003) 
4 Woods and another v Liberia (2003) AHRLR I 1 I (ACHPR 2003). 
5 Aigbe v Nigeria (2003) AHRLR 128 (ACHPR 2003); iyfovement des Refugies Mauritamens 
all Senegal v Senegal (2003) AHRLR 131 (ACHPR 2003); Instllute .for human rights and 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
communications include non-discrimination, equality before the law, the 
right to a fair trial, freedom from torture, the right to liberty and security, 
and the right to collective peace and security. All the communications are 
reported in the African Human Rights Law Report 2003. The article is 
structured in the form of a case-by-case commentary. Each case is dis-
cussed in terms of its admissibility and merits. 
2 'LUNATICS AND IDIOTS?': PUROHIT AND ANOTHER v THE 
GAMBIA 
Mental patients are often invisible. They are invisible, not only in Africa, 
but in the world in general. Although there are global instruments, such as 
the Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with 
Disabilities, adopted by UN General Assembly in 1993,7 and the Principles 
for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and Improvement of 
Mental Health Care,s there is no regional declaration or instrument dealing 
with the rights of mental patients. In this light, the present communica-
tion provided a valuable opportunity for the Commission to explore the 
human rights status of mental patients. 
The communication was submitted by Ms Purohit and Mr More, mental 
health advocates, on behalf of patients in Campama, a psychiatric unit of 
the Royal Victoria Hospital, and 'existing and future mental health pa-
tients detained under the Mental Health Acts of the Republic of Gambia,9 
The complainants alleged that the Lunatics Detention Act (LOA) was 
outdated and posed serious problems to patients' well-being. The com-
plainants argued that the Act failed to provide a clear definition of 'lunatic' 
and provisions regUlating the standard of treatment and care of patients. 
Funhermore, the patients were detained in an overcrowded unit and 
there was no independent evaluation of the functioning of the unit." The 
patients detained in the psychiatric unit were deprived of their right to 
vote and legal aid. '2 The Act failed to protect the patients' right to consent 
to treatment, and it failed to make provisions for compensation when the 
patient'S rights were Violated." The complainants hence submitted that 
the patients' rights under articles 2, 3, 5, 7 (I )(a) and (c), 13( I), 16 and 
18(4) of the African Charter had been violated." 
development in Africa (on behalf of Simbarakiye) v Democratic Republic of the Conyo 
(2003) AHRLR 65(ACHPR 2003). 
6 Purohit and Another v The Gambia (2003) AHRLR 96 (ACHPR 2003) 
7 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/96 of 20 December 1993 
8 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/1 19 adopted on 17 December 1991 
9 Purohit case (fn 6 above) par 1 
10 Par 4. 
II Pars 5·6. 
12 Pars 7-8. 
13 Par 8. 
14 African Charter. Art 2 Non-discrimination; An '3 Equality before the law; Art 5 Right 
w dignity: Art 7( I )(a) Right (0 appeal: Art 7( I )(e) Right (0 defence: Art 1 3( 1) to 











































COMMUNICATIONS OF THE AFRlCAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS 
Admissibility of communications submitted under article 55 of the Afri-
can Charter is governed by article 56. The main issue regarding the 
admissibility of the present communication was article 56(5) which re-
quires complainants to exhaust local remedies before submitting a case 
before the Commission. The rationale behind the rule of exhaustion of 
local remedies is to give the respondent state a first-hand opportunity to 
address the alleged violations of human rights within its own domestic 
legal framework. 6 
On the issue of exhaustion of local remedies, the complainants submit-
ted that it was impossible to exhaust local remedies, as the national laws 
of the Gambia did not provide legal recourse to mental patients whose 
rights were violated. The respondent state, while conceding that under the 
LOA there was no provision for review or appeal procedures, argued that 
legal recourse could be sought through a constitutional challenge. How-
ever, the respondent state further noted that there was no legal aid or 
assistance to vulnerable groups, except when persons were charged with 
capital offences. Hence the issue in this case is not the non-existence of 
domestic remedies but the availability of such remedies to the vulnerable 
groups in question. The Commission, in this case, considered 'theoretical 
and practical' aspeCls of the remedies. In order for the remedies to be 
available and effective, the remedy should be both theoretical and practi-
cal. 18 The Commission, to assess the availability and effectiveness of 
domestic remedies in this particular case, examined the nature and status 
of persons detained under the Act. It decided that domestic remedies 
were, in fact, unavailable in reality because the particular people repre-
sented in this communication were 'likely to be picked up from the streets 
or people from a poor background' who were mostly likely unable to 
afford private counsel. '0 
One of the main issues with regard to the merits of the case is the na-
ture and extent of state responsibility under international human rights 
treaties. The Gambia, as a State Party to the African Charter, is under an 
obligation to ratify and amend domestic laws that are in conflict with the 
human rights standards enshrined in the African Charter. The failure to 
act upon the treaty obligation would defeat the main object of ratifying a 
human rights treaty. Such sentiment is clearly reflected in the Commis-
sion's decision on articles 6 and 16. Although the Commission decided 
15 Art 56 of the African Charter establishes 7 conditions including identification of authors 
of communications, a reasonable time limit and exhaustion of local remedies. 
16 Purohit case (fn 6 above) par 25; Also see Jawara v The Gambia (2000) AHRLR 107 
(ACHPR 2000) par 31 
17 Institute jor human rights in Ajrica v Democratic Republic oj the Congo (2001) AHRLR 65 
(ACHPR 2003) par 26. Although the communication was declared inadmissible due 1O 
non-exhaustion of local remedies, (he Commission (oak the opponuni(y to further ex-
pand on rhe principle of local remedies. The Commission viewed that without both 
'(heoretical and pranical' elements of the existence of local remedy. the remedy cannot 
be said to be available or efFec!lve. 
18 Ibid par 26. 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
that article 6 of the African Charter had not been violated, because the 
article does not provide for the cases where a person is institutionalised 
due to medical reasons,'o it nevertheless took the opportunity to urge 
states to take an active role in domesticating international human rights 
standards. 21 The Commission, interpreting article 6, which states that 'no 
one may be deprived of his freedom except for the reasons and condi-
tions previously laid down by the law',22 rightly pointed out that, despite 
the 'claw back' clause built into the article, the State Party to the African 
Charter could not rely on the mere existence of the domestic law.
21 
The 
Commission, reflecting the state's obligation under international human 
rights treaties, stated that domestic laws should be brought in line with 
international principles and standards.
24 
Furthermore, related to the issue of the extent and nature of state obli-
gations under the international treaties, the Commission considered that 
the LOA failed to uphold the standard of medical care and assistance 
enshrined in article 16." The Commission adopted a broad interpretation 
of the right to health, and declared that the right included 'the right to 
health facilities, access to goods and services' without discrimination of 
any kind. 26 Interpreting the right to health together with article 18(4) of the 
Charter, the Commission granted 'special measures of protection' to 
mental patients.
27 
The Commission's decision echoed closely the ICESCR 
General Comment 14.28 While the Commission acknowledged the practi-
cal difficulties that State Parties face, it, nonetheless, observed that the 
state has an obligation under article 16 to 'take concrete and targeted 
steps' to ensure the realisation of the right to health without discrimina-
tion.
29 
Another broad underlying theme of [he case is the application of the 
principle of non-discrimination. In this case, the Commission had an 
opportunity to rule, both directly and indirectly, on the issue of non-
discrimination. 'o The Commission held that the lack of practical legal 
recourse for the people who are detained under the LOA constitutes a 
20 Par 68. 
21 Par 64. 
22 African Charter, art 6. 
23 Purohit case (fn 6 above) pars 64-65. 
24 Par 64. 
25 Par 83. 
26 Par 80. 
27 Par 81, Art 18(4) of the African Charter provides that the aged and tile disabled should 
have the 'right to special measures of protection'. 
28 Substantive issues arising from the implementation of the leESCR, General Comment 
No 14 (2000) The right to the highest attainable standard of health (Art 12 of the 
ICESCR), par 1 1 interprets the right to health to include not only health care, but also 
'the underlying determinants of health' such as food, healthy environment, adequate 
sanitation, safe water and housing; also see Mbazira C 'The right to health and the na-
ture of socio-economic rights obligations under the African Charter' (2005) 6 ESR 4. 
29 Purohit case (fn 6 above) par 84. 
30 The Commission considered the issue of non-discrimination directly when determining 
whether the Cambia had violated articles 2 and 3, and indirectly when considering arti-










































COMMUNICATIONS OF THE AFRlCAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS 
violation of articles 2 and 3, which essentially deal with non-discrimination 
and equal protection before the law. Unfortunately, the Commission did 
not fully explore the issue with regard to people with disabilities. Mental 
illness is defined as a disability under the Standard Rules on the Equaliza-
tion of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities. Article 2 of the African 
Charter prohibits discrimination based on 'race, ethnic group, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social 
origin, fortune, birth or other status.'J? It would have been desirable if the 
Commission took the opportunity to include disability in 'other status' to 
strengthen the rights of people with disabilities. 
The Commission's decision on the issue of non-discrimination echoes 
its opinion on the matters of exhaustion of local remedies. The respon-
dent state argued that the mental patients detained under the LDA could 
bring claims under the tort law that and patients have the right to chal-
lenge the Act in the Constitutional Court of the Gambia. However, consid-
ering that there is no legal aid or assistance, the Commission was of the 
view that only a certain privileged group of people could afford such legal 
recourse. Such can be viewed as discrimination based on 'social origin 
and fortune'" and such provisions fall short of international standards.;' 
The Commission again emphasized the application of a principle of non-
discrimination in respect of a right to enjoy a right to human dignity. The 
Commission emphasized that mentally disabled persons also have the 
right to enjoy a decent life and that their dignity should be protected and 
respected 35 Determining whether the Gambia had violated article 5 of the 
African Charter, the Commission drew its inspiration from both its juris-
prudence't and the United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons 
with Mental Illness and Improvement of Mental Care." The Commission's 
decision that the language of the LDA that branded persons with mental 
illness as 'lunatics' and 'idiots' dehumanised and violated the right to 
human dignity protected under article 5 of the African Charter, seems to 
indicate its continued efforts to interpret the wording of the article as 
broadly as possible.'s The principle of non-discrimination also sets the 
basis for interpreting article I 3( 1) of the African Charter. Article 1 3( I ) 
provides 'every citizen' with the right to political participation which right 
should be applied 'in accordance with the provisions of the law.'" Inter-
preting 'every citizen', the Commission held that the right may only be 
31 Standard Rules (tn 8 above) par 17. 
32 African Charter, art 2. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Purohit case (fn 6 above) at pars 52-53. 
35 Par 60. 
36 Par 58; see Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 282 (ACHPR 2000) and Modise 
v BotsWanil (2000) AHRLR 30 (ACHPR 2000) for a discussion on 'cruel, inhuman or de, 
grading punishmenr and treatment' 
37 Purohit case (In 6 above) par 60. 
38 Par 59; see Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria (fn 36 above) 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
limited on the basis of the 'legal incapacity' or citizenship status of an 
individual 40 The Commission differentiated between 'legal incapacity' and 
'mental incapacity' and found that the respondent state violated art 13( I) 
of the African Charter. 41 However, its concern has more to do with the 
lack of 'objective and reasonable criteria based on law' to prohibit political 
participation of metal patients than with advocating a blanket application 
of the right. 42 
3 INCOMMUNICADO DETENTION CASE: ZEGVELD AND 
ANOTHER v ERITREA" 
The human rights situation is notoriously precarious in Eritrea. Various 
international human rights NGOs, such as Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch, have frequently expressed their concern over 
violations of civil and political rights in Eritrea. In its 2003 regional over-
view, Amnesty International criticised the Eritrea government for employ-
ing malicious prosecution and arbitrary arrests as a tool for political 
repression.
44 
Arbitrary arrests and prolonged detentions without trial are 
rampant, and journalists and human rights defenders are often harassed 
by the security force." The present communication concerns a prolonged 
detention of I I political leaders of the People's Front for Democracy and 
Justice (PFDJ). 
The communication was submitted by Dr Liesbeth Zegveld, an interna-
tional lawyer, and Mr Mussie Ephrem, an Eritrean citizen living in Swe-
den. The complainants alleged that I I former Eritrean government 
officers were illegally arrested in September 200 I and detained for more 
than 18 months without being formally Charged. It was further alleged 
that the detainees were refused access to their families or lawyers. The 
complainants made a request for habeas corpus to the Ministry of Justice 
of Eritrea but received no reply. The complainants alleged a violation of 
articles 2, 6, 7( I), and 9(2) of the African Charter. 
The main issue in relation to the admissibility of the particular case was 
the exhaustion of local remedies. Article 56(5) of the African Charter 
requires complainants to have exhausted the local remedies before sub-
mitting communications to the Commission.'o The complainants argued 
that their attempts to exhaust local remedies were met with indifference 
and that their efforts brought no response from the Eritrean authorities
47 
The Commission's decision on the issue of exhaustion of local remedies 
40 Purohit case (t"n 6 above) par 75. 
41 Par 76. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Zegveld and Another v Eritrea (2003) AIIRLR 72 (ACHPR 2003). 
44 Africa regional overview (fn 1 above). 
45 Ibid; also see Human rights overview on Eritrea Ifuman Rights Watch, available at 
hnp:llwww.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/21/eritrea6987.htm. 
46 Art 56(5) of the African Charter provides that 'communications .. are sent after exhaust-
ing local remedies, if any, unless this procedure is unduly prolonged.' 










































COMMUNICATIONS OF THE AFRlCAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS 
in this particular communication reflects its continued effort to apply the 
rule to accommodate the realities in many African states, As the Commis-
sion held in Amnesty International and Others v Sudan," the local remedies 
should be exhausted as long as they are independent from political pres-
sure,q It is noted in the African regional overview that the judiciary in 
Eritrea was undermined and heavily influenced by the government. 50 
Considering the above situation in Eritrea, the Commission refused to 
apply the rule of the exhaustion of local remedies blindly, Despite the 
respondent state's argument that the delay of the hearing was due to the 
congested court schedule, the Commission held that the member state 
has the responSibility to bring a person detained before a competent court 
of law [0 ensure that [he person is tried 'in accordance with national and 
international standards' The Commission further held that the state is 
reqUired to provide 'an effective and possible remedy' to alleged 
victims at the domestic level. Therefore, the Commission felt that, in the 
present case, the complainants were prevented from exhausting local 
remedies; hence the case was declared admissible. 
Concerning the request of the respondent state to reconsider its deci-
sion on admissibility, the Commission pointed out two things, First of all, 
the Commission noted that the respondent state had failed to present any 
new element on admissibility, The Commission took its inspiration from 
the Inter-American Court's decision in the Velasquez case," where the 
Inter-American Court decided that, where the complainants raise the issue 
of non-availability of local remedies, the burden of proof will shift to the 
respondent state claiming non-exhaustion, Such state has the obligation to 
prove that local remedies are available and effecrive, Secondly, the Com-
mission considered rule 1 18(2) of the African Commission's Rules of 
Procedure, The rule stipulates that the Commission may reconsider its 
decision declaring a communication inadmissible, when it is requested,5' 
However, rule 1 18(2) does not provide for the reconsideration of a deci-
sion declaring a communication admissible," 
On the issue of merits, the Commission seemed to be concerned with 
the interpretation and application of lawful restrictions ('claw back' 
clauses) of the rights enshrined in the African Charter. The Commission, 
after considering the fact that the 1 1 persons were detained incommunicado 
since September 2001 and had never been formally charged, declared that 
48 Amnesty lnlemalional and Others v Sudan (2000) AHRLR 297(ACHPR 1999), 
49 Par 31, 
50 Africa regional overview (ff! labove). 
51 Zegveld case (fn 43 above) at par 35. 
52 Par 39, 
53 Velasquez ROdriguez v Honduras, judgment of 29 July 1988, Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) 4 
(1988) cited In Zegveld case (fn 43 above) par 36, 
54 Zegveld case (fn 43 above) par 45; Rule I 18(2) of the African Commission's Rules of 
Procedure states [hat 'if the Commission has declared a communication inadmissible 
under the Chaner, it may reconsider [his decision at a later date if it receives a request 
t'or reconsideration.' 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
the respondent state violated articles 2. 6, and 7(1) of the African Charter. 
The Commission pointed out that. although article 6 is not an absolute 
right. the African Charter forbids arbitrary arrests and detention. 56 The 
Commission also expressed its concerns regarding incommunicado deten-
tion. The Commission is of the view that incommunicado detention is 'a 
gross violation of human rights' that can lead to other violations." Fur-
thermore, the Commission held that prolonged incommunicado detention 
could itself be 'a form of cruel. inhuman or degrading punishment and 
treatment",g which is prohibited under article 5 of the African Charter." 
Although the complainants did not the violation of article 5 of the 
African Charter in the communication. the Commission took the opportu-
nity to contemplate the issue of detention and stated that 'all' detentions 
should conform to basic standards of human rights. 60 When determining 
whether anicle 9(2)61 was violated or no£, the Commission once again 
concerned itself with arbitrary restrictions of freedom of expression based 
on national laws that fall short of international human rights standards. 
The Commission conceded that freedom of expression comes with duties 
and can be restricted by laws. but that 'any laws restricting freedom of 
expression must conform to international human rights norms and stan-
dards relating to freedom of expression,M In the light of the present case, 
the Commission found that the restrictions imposed by the respondent 
state violated not only the African Charter but also international human 
rights standards and norms.M 
4 POLITICAL REPRESSION AND VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
DURING THE FIRST DECADE OF PRESIDENT UMAR HASSAN 
AL-BASHIR'S REGIME IN SUDAN: THREE ILLUSTRATIVE CASES 
In 1989, Sudan was pushed into dictatorship when General al-Bashir 
assumed power through a coup. He subsequently banned all political 
parties and controlled the Sudanese press in order to restrict the political 
56 Par 52. 
57 Par 55. 
58 Par 5. 
59 An 5 of the Mrican Charter grants a right to dignilY and prohibits 'all forms of explOita-
tion and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment and treatment'. 
60 Zegveld case (fn 43 above) par 55; also see Achulhan and Another (on behalf oj Banda and 
Others) v Malawi (2000) AHRLR 144 (ACHPR 1995), par 7. The Commission examines 
the condition of detention and decided Ihal 'excessive solitary confinement, shackling 
within a cell, extremely poor quality food and denial of access to adequate medical 
care' were in violation of article 5. 
61 Art 9(2) of the African Charter provides that every individual has the right (0 express 
and disseminate his opinions within the law. 
62 Zegve/d case (fn 43 above) par 59; Principle I I (2) of the Declaration of principles on 
freedom of expression in Africa reads, 'any restrictions on freedom of expression shall 
be provided by law, serve a legitimate interest and be necessary and in a democratic 
SOCiety'. 
63 Par 60. 










































COMMUNICATIONS OF THE AFR.ICAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS 
space of his opponents. Sharia was imposed in northern Sudan in 1991 65 
During the first decade of al-Bashir's regime, arbitrary arrest and torture 
were used as a political tool to oppress the government's opponents. 6b In 
1999, a law which limited political 'associations' was enacted. Further, in 
December 1999, a state of national emergency was declared by presiden-
tial decree in Sudan, the parliament was dissolved and the constitution 
was suspended. The three cases discussed below deal with the violations 
of a range of civil and political rights during that period, including viola-
tions stemming from political oppression as well as the imposition of 
Sharia. 
4.1 Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v Sudan (It 
The case is a consolidation of two communications against Sudan. Both 
communications were brought in 1998 and 1999 on behalf of victims of 
alleged violations of articles 5, 6 and 7( 1 )(a), (b). (c) and (d) of the African 
Charterb8 by the government of Sudan. The first communication involved 
three persons who were arrested and jailed for conduct which, according 
to the respondent state, amounted to terrorist activities that disturbed 
national peace and security. These three persons were held incommuni-
cado without charge for two months, during which they were allegedly 
tortured. The second communication involved 26 civilians who were tried 
and convicted by a military court for having destabilized the constitutional 
system in Sudan
6Q 
Subsequent to an appeal to the Constitutional Court, 
the 26 civilians were pardoned and released on condition that they re-
nounce their right to claim damages from the government. The complain-
ant sought compensation for the violations before the Commission. The 
Commission was not satisfied with the contention that the release of the 
victims amounted to compensation
70 
It held that, even if the situation in 
the country had improved, the government remained accountable for the 
acts in violation of its human rights obligations. The communications 
were held admissible under article 56(5) for exhaustion of local remedies 
in the first communication and ineffectiveness and non-accessibility of 
local remedies in the second. 
65 'Omar Hasan Ahamad al-Bashir'. available at tlt[p:l/en.wikipedia.org/wikilUmar~ 
Hasan~al-Bashir. 
66 Rone J 'Human rights watch condemns summary trials of opponents' (1998) available at 
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/1998/02/13/sudan I 04~txthtm 
67 Law OJJice oj Ghazi Suleiman v Sudan (l) (2003) AHRLR 134 (ACHPR 2003) 
68 Art 5 on the right to dignity, prohibition of torture and slavery; art 6 on the right to 
liberty and security; art 7 on the right to a fair trial. 
69 The 26 civilians were accused of inciting people to war or engaging to the war against 
the state, inCiting opposition against the government and abeuing criminal or terrorist 
organisations. In both cases, the manifestations were targeted at the then military re-
gime in Sudan. 
70 Sudan (I) case (fn 67 above) pars 39-40. The Commission consistently adopted this 
position, especially in cases involving allegations of torture. See also Organisation 
Mondiale Contre la Torture and Others v Rwanda (2000) AHRLR 282 (ACHPR 1996) cited 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
On the merits of the case, the Commission examined the obligations of 
states under articles 5, 6 and 7. Right from the start. the Commission 
stated that the obligations of states under articles 5, 6 and 7 are of an erga 
omnes nature, and refuted the contention of the respondent state that 
domestic laws on national security take precedence over the international 
law on individual's rights, including the African Charter.
71 
The Commission 
therefore held that national emergency does not amount to an exception 
to the application of articles 5, 6 and 7. Regarding the violation of article 
5, the Sudanese government did not contest that acts of torture were 
conducted against the victims while they were in detention. 72 The Com-
mission took the view that states are at all times responsible for acts of 
wrture conducted in their terriwry, regardless of the identity of the perpe-
trawrs. It therefore held that the obligations of states under article 5 are 
not limited w undertakings to hold accountable those who committed 
wrture, but also, and most importantly, to take preventative measures 
against acts of torture.·lJ Failing such measures, the Commission found the 
government of Sudan to be in violation of article 5 of the African Charter. 
Regarding the violation of article 6, the Commission found that arresting 
individuals and detaining them without charging them constitutes a prima 
facie violation of the right not to be illegally detained, contained in article 
6 of the African Charter. 74 The government of Sudan did not contest the 
facts in this regard. The Commission therefore found the respondent state 
to be in violation of articles 5 and 6 of the African Charter. 
Regarding the violation of article 7( I), the Commission carefully dis-
sected the facts to subject them to the application of article 7( J). Accord-
ingly, the Commission found a violation of article 7(1 )(a) on the basis that 
the victims had w renounce their right to appeal upon being pardoned. 
The CommiSSion also emphasised that civilians should not be tried by a 
military court, even during times of national emergency.7' Further, the 
Commission found a violation of article 7(1 )(b) on the basis that some 
state officers were responSible for publicity aimed at declaring the sus-
pects guilty of an offence before a competent court had established their 
guilt or innocence. Furthermore, on the contention that the victims were 
refused legal representation, the Commission found that refusing the 
victims the right to be represented by the lawyer of their choice amounted 
to a violation of article 7(1 )(C)70 Finally, although the Commission protested 
against the procedural irregularity of civilians being tried by a military 
court,77 it proceeded to consider the competence, independence and impar-
tiality of the military court in this case. Accordingly, the Commission 
71 Sudan (1) (fn 67 above) pars 38·39. 
72 The Commission conceded that detention incommunicado amounts to inhuman treat· 
ment for both the detainees and their families. See par 44. 
73 Par 46. 
74 Par 50. 
75 Par 53. 
76 See also Amnesty Internalional and Others v Sudan (fn 48 above) and Civil Liberties 
Organisation v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 186 (ACHPR 1995). 
77 See also the Commission's resolution on the right to a fair trial and legal aid in Africa 










































COMMUNICATIONS OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS 
found that the composition of the military court alone, in this case a 
majority of active military officers appointed by the President, was a clear 
indication of the lack of impartiality of the military court.'8 The impartial-
ity of the panel of judges was undermined by their being under military 
regulations during a military regime, but also because they did not receive 
adequate legal training and qualifications.'9 The same position was held in 
International Pen and Others (on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria. 80 The 
Commission did not deem it necessary to further consider the independ-
ence of the military court. It found a violation of article 7( I). 
4.2 Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v Sudan (II/, 
The communication was filed by a law firm based in Khartoum on behalf 
of Mr Ghazi Suleiman. In January 1999, Mr Suleiman was invited to give a 
public lecture to a human rights organisation in Sinnar, Blue Nile State. He 
was prohibited from travelling and was threatened by security officers. 
Furthermore, between 1999 and 2002, Mr Suleiman suffered several 
arrests and attacks on his office and person. The complainant alleged 
violations of articles 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the African Charter."2 It was also 
alleged that all such rights were suspended under the National Security 
Act 1994, as amended in 1996. 83 
Determining the issue of admissibility, the Commission was again faced 
with the question of the exhaustion of local remedies. The Commission is 
of the view that the rule of the exhaustion of local remedies under arti-
cle 56(5) is one of the most important conditions for admissibility of the 
communication'"' However, the Commission argued in Institute for Human 
Rights in Africa v DRC that the rule of the exhaustion of local remedies has 
never been applied ipso facto for receiving a communication. 85 The Com-
mission has developed an extensive jurisprudence around the issue and has 
consistently applied the rule, with full regard to realities in various African 
states. In the present case, the Commission considered the effectiveness 
and accessibility of the local remedies in Sudan under the particular circum-
stances of the alleged victim, Mr Suleiman. In its earlier decision, Amnesty 
International and Others v Sudan,so the Commission interpreted the require-
ment provided in article 56(5) as 'the exhaustion of all domestic remedies, 
if they are of a judicial nature, are effective and are not subordinate to the 
78 The Commission confused terms at par 64 when i[ noted [hat 'the composition of the 
military court alone is evidence of impartiality.' 
79 See Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria (fn 36 above) cited by the Commission. 
80 International Pen and Others (on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 212 
(ACHPR 1998) 
81 Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v Sudan (II), (2003) AH RLR 144 (ACH PR 2003). 
82 African Charter, Art 9 Right to information; Art 10 Right to free association; Art 1 I Right 
to assembly; Art 12 Freedom of movement. 
83 Sudan (II) case (fn 81 above) par 6. 
84 Par 29; also seeJawara v The Gambia (fn 16 above) par 30. 
85 Institute for Human Rights in Africa v DRC (fn 1 7above) par 28. 
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discretionary power of the public authorities' .87 Considering the political 
situation in Sudan, the Commission decided that exhausting local reme-
dies, in this particular case, would be an unjustifiably long process and the 
effectiveness of the result would also be questionable."" Furthermore, the 
Commission noted that the National Security Act of 1994, which prohibits 
any legal action or appeal against the decisions taken under the law, 
violates the right to an appeal provided under article 7 of the African 
Charter. 8Q The right to an appeal, the Commission rightly stated, is another 
'determinant for the fulfillment of the requirement of exhaustion of local 
remedies' .90 For the above reasons, the communication was declared 
admissible. 
The Commission was asked to consider whether articles 9, 10, 1 I, and 
12 had been violated. Relying on article 60 of the African Charter, the 
Commission drew inspiration from international jurisprudence."' The 
Commission carefully considered the value of freedom of expression and 
tried to find a balance between necessary restrictions based on law and 
arbitrary restrictions. Drawing from the Inter-American Court's and Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights' decisions, the Commission declared that Mr 
Suleiman's speech, which promotes human rights and democracy, 'is of a 
special value to society and deserving of special protection'. 92 Although 
articles 9, 10, 1 1, and 12 allegedly violated by the respondent state, are 
not absolute rights and the limitations are provided within the provisions, 
the Commission stated that the laws restricting those rights should con-
form to the standards and principles of international human rights. The 
Commission found that the arbitrary and excessive restrictions placed 
upon such rights constitute violations of articles 9, 10, 1 I, and 12 by the 
respondent state. Furthermore, the Commission argued that frequent 
arrests, detentions and threats also constitute a violation of article 6 of the 
African Charter 9 ) 
The Commission found the violation of articles 6, 9, 10, I I, and 12 of 
the African Charter. 
4.3 Curtis Doebbler v Sudan"' 
In this communication, eight Sudanese students were arrested and con-
victed in 1999 for having violated 'public order'. The communication was 
brought before the Commission on their behalf by an American lawyer. 
Their behaviour consisted of girls kissing, wearing trousers, dancing with 
men, crossing legs with men, and Sitting and talking with boys, which were 
87 Amnesty Intemarional case (fn 48 above) par 37 cited in Sudan (I/) case (fn 81 above) par 
30. 
88 Sudan 11 case (fn 81 above) par 36. 
89 Par 35. 
90 Par 34. 
91 Article 60 of the African Charter proVides thal the Commission 'shall draw inspiration 
from international law on human and peoples' rights .. ' 
92 Sudan (II) case (fn 78 above) par 52. 
93 Par 53. 
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contrary to article 152 of the Sudanese Criminal Code. All eight students 
were sentenced to fines and lashes. The punishments were carried out 
immediately after the verdict and sentencing by the coun of first instance. 
The complainant alleged violation of article 5 of the African Charter on the 
basis that the punishment was disproportionate, as the acts for which the 
students were punished constituted minor offences. The complainant 
sought reparation for the violations. The communication was declared 
admissible on the basis that local remedies were inaccessible because the 
victims had no legal representation. 
On the merits of the case, the Commission considered whether the pun-
ishment administered to the eight students constituted cruel, inhuman 
and degrading punishment contrary to article 5 of the African Charter. 
Referring to an earlier decision," the Commission affirmed that article 5 
should be interpreted 'to encompass the widest possible array of physical 
and mental abuses'. The Commission avoided delving into the question 
of the application or limitation of human ri~~ts standards in Sharia, be-
cause none of the parties invited it to do so. ' Conversely, it ordered that 
the Sudanese Criminal Law be amended to take into account Sudan's 
obligations under the African Charter, thus making clear the supremacy of 
the African Charter over domestic laws, including Sharia. The Commission 
therefore held that human rights are universal standards. the application 
of which cannot be precluded by religious and cultural particularism. It 
logically flowed from the reasoning of the Commission that human rights 
obligations are universaL The Commission therefore referred to the juris-
prudence of the European Court of Human Rights to define international 
standards pertaining to cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.
98 
It concluded that although 'ultimately whether an act constitutes inhuman 
degrading punishment or punishment depends on the circumstances of 
the case','" 
ltjthere is no right for individuals, and particularly the government of a country, 
to apply physical violence to individuals for offences, Such a right would be 
tantamount to sanctioning state-sponsored torture under the Charter and con-
trary to the very nature of this human rights treaty.'oo 
The Commission therefore held that the prohibition of torture, cruel 
inhumane and degrading punishment and treatment contained in article 5 
of the Charter creates an obligation erga omnes. The Commission found 
Sudan to be in violation of article 5 of the African Charter and 'requested' 
the government of Sudan to amend its criminal law to comply with its 
obligations under the African Charter. 
95 See Huri-Laws v Niyeria (2000) AHRLH 273 (ACHPR 200()). 
96 Curtis DoeblJler case (fn 94 above) par 17, 
97 Par 41. 
98 At par 38, the Commission referred [0 the case of Tyrer v United Kingdom (2 EHRR 1 
( 1979-80)) 
99 Par 37, 
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The state of emergency was lifted in Sudan in July 2005, except in the 
unsettled areas of Darfur. However, the human rights situation in Sudan 
has worsened with the on-going conflict in Darfur. 
5 A STEP BACKWARDS TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN AFRICA: INTERIGHTS AND OTHERS (ON 
BEHALF OF MARIETTE SONJALEEN BOSCH) V BOTSWANA 101 
Botswana is one of the 23 African countries that still retain and inflict the 
death penalty.lo, Sections 4(1) and 7(2) of the Constitution of Botswana 
recognise the death penalty as an exception to the right to life and a 
sentence that a court of law can impose.lo3 Since Botswana's independ-
ence in 1966, 39 people have been han~ed in the country.I04 The latest 
execution was conducted in April 2006. I The execution of Ms Bosch, a 
South African national, drew attention to the practice of the death penalty 
in Botswana, which drastically contrasts with that of her neighbour.
lob 
Ms Bosch was convicted and sentenced to death by hanging for murder 
by the High Court of Botswana. The decision of the High Court was later 
upheld by the Court of Appeal of Botswana, the highest court in the coun-
try. The communication to the Commission was submitted by Interights 
and two United Kingdom and Botswana-based advocates on behalf of the 
victim. Ms Bosch was executed soon after the Court of Appeal's decision, 
despite a request by the Commission to stay the execution pending its 
decision. The communication alleged violation of articles I, 4, 5 and 
7( 1 )(b) of the African Charter. It was found to fulfil the requirement of the 
exhaustion of local remedies prescribed in article 56(5) and was thus 
declared admissible. 
On the allegation of violation of article 7(I)(b), the complainant submit-
ted that, in the High Court and in the Court of Appeal, the judges wrongly 
put the onus of proof on the accused, thus obliging her to prove that 
someone else was responsible for the killing. This, according to the com-
plainant, constituted a violation of the right to be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty by a competent court. The complainant further argued that 
this misdirection of both courts affected the outcome of the trial and 
therefore violated article 4 of the Charter. In this regard, the Commission 
101 lnterights and Others (on behalf oj Mariette Sonjaleen Bosch) v Botswana (2003) AHRLR 
55 (ACHPR 2003) 
102 See Chenwi L 'Towards [he abolition of the death penalty in Africa. A human rights 
perspective' (2005) LLD thesis, University of Pretoria, unpublished at 33. See also Van 
Zyl D The death penalty in Africa' (2004) 4 AJrican Human Rights Law Journal 1-16 at 
2. 
103 Excerpts of BOlswana's ConstitUlion are reprinted in Heyns C (ed) }fuman rights law in 
Africa (2004) 908-91 7. 
104 See Gabotlale B 'Death penalty: Five years after Bosch. nothing changed in Botswana' 
(2006). available at http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews= 33275. 
105 Ibid. 
106 In the case of S v Makwanyane (1995 (3) SA 391) in 1995, South Africa's Constitutional 
Court found the death penalty to be inconsistent with the Constitution (s I I (2) of the 
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held that '[a] breach of article 7(1) of the Charter would only arise if the 
conviction had resulted from such misdirection'. 107 It found that the Court 
of Appeal corrected the error of the High Court when it 'meticulously 
evaluated the evidence and came to the only conclusion possible' ,108 that 
is, Ms Bosch's culpability for the murder. The Commission therefore found 
that, in this particular case, justice was properly rendered by the Botswana 
courts. Article 7(1)(b) was therefore not violated. Consequently, in view of 
the finding that due process was respected in convicting Ms Bosch, the 
Commission concluded that the victim was not arbitrarily deprived of her 
life and article 4 of the Charter was not violated. The fairness, or lack of it, 
of the clemency procedure was considered irrelevant because the exercise 
of clemency by a head of state is discretionary; only judicial trials can be 
challenged for arbitrariness. Ms Bosch was given an opportunity to have 
her cause heard and it was only that trial that could be challenged as 
arbitrary. The Commission did not find the death penalty to be a prima 
facie violation of the Charter. IOq It only ascertained that Ms Bosch's trial 
was properly conducted so as to avoid that an innocent person is sen-
tenced to death. liD The Commission did not find it necessary to address 
the question whether the failure of the Botswana government to respect 
its request to stay execution violated articles 1, 4 and 7( 1) of the Charter. 
It simply accepted the argument that the respondent state never received 
the request and therefore was not aware of it.
111 
Concerning the allegation of violation of article 5, the complainant alleged, 
on the one hand, that the imposition of the death penalty constituted a 
disproportionate sentence given the circumstances of the case and, on the 
other, that the failure of the government of Botswana to notify the vic-
tim's family of the date and time of execution constituted a cruel, inhu-
man and degrading punishment and treatment. The Commission held 
that extenuating circumstances should be found in relation to the state of 
mind of the accused at the time of commission of the crime. The Com-
mission did not find any extenuating circumstances because Ms Bosch 
'involved considerable effort and careful planning,l" in preparing the 
murder. No violation was found on the basis that the death penalty consti-
tuted a disproportionate sentence. The Commission did not pronounce 
itself on the issue of reasonable notice for the reason that the respondent 
state was not given sufficient time to prepare counter-arguments on the 
107 Interights and Others v Botswana (Fn 101 above) par 26. 
108 Ibid. 
109 The AFrican Charter does not prohibit the death penalty. The European Convention For 
the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the American Con-
vention on Human Rights did not originally contain any prohibition of the death pen-
alty either, but that was later altered by the adoption of protocols to the conventions. 
1 10 The Commission took the same position in International Pen and Others (on behalf oj 
Ken Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria (Fn 81 above). 
1 1 I Chenwi argues that this decision of the Commission could open a door For abuse by 
states. See Chenwi L 'What Future For the death penalty in AFrica'! An appraisal of the 
case of Interights et aI (on behalf oj Mariette Sonjaleen Bosch) v Botswana' (2005) 12 
Amicus Journal I 3- I 5. 
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issue and it would have therefore been unfair for the respondent state to 
deal with its substance. The Commission merely quoted the standards set 
in other jurisdictions, without mentioning whether, in the specific case, 
these were respected. Most importantly, the Commission failed to clarify 
what sufficient notice amounts to, in cases involving the death penalty. 
when Ms Bosch was executed 60 days after the decision of the Court of 
Appeal of Botswana. It is regrettable that. on this issue. the Commission 
gave more importance to procedure than to substance."} One would have 
expected the Commission to set further minimum standards that states 
imposing death sentences must respect, beSides the requirement for 
respect of due process. Furthermore, the Commission did not find any 
violation of article 1 of the African Charter. 
With regard to the death penalty. the Commission's position has, so far. 
been consistent. The death penalty is not a prima jacie violation of arti-
cles 4 and 5 of the African Charter. Article 4, according to which no 
person should be arbitrarily deprived of his life. is violated only if due 
process in the imposition of a death sentence is not respected. It is regret-
table that, despite the fact that the Commission noted the current trend of 
abolition of the death penalty, it did not find that the very retention of the 
death penalty itself constitutes a violation of the right to life and the right 
to be free from cruel. inhuman and degrading treatment under the African 
Charter. It used weak language to encourage all states party to the Charter 
to 'take all measures to refrain from exercising the death penalty'. The 
African Commission's Resolution Urging the States to Envisage a Morato-
rium on the Death Penalty of 1999 is an encouraging step towards the 
abolition of the death penalty in Africa. However, as the guardian of 
human rights in Africa, the Commission needs to take a stronger stance 
against the death penalty, including through legally binding decisions. 
6 CONTRADICTORY DECISION ON LOCUS STANDI: THE CASE 
Of ASSOCIATION POUR LA SAUVEGARDE DE LA PAIX AU 
BURUNDI V KENYA, RWANDA, TANZANIA, UGANDA, ZAIRE 
ANDZAMBIA'l4 
The crisis in the Great Lakes region culminated in 1994 with the Rwandan 
genocide. Although peace was re-esmblished in the country, killings of 
Tutsis and Hu[Us persisted in the neighbouring country of Burundi. This 
communication was brought before the Commission by the Association 
pour fa Sauvegarde de fa Paix au Burundi (Association for the Preservation 
of Peace in Burundi), a non-governmental organisation based in Belgium. 
The communication pertains to the alleged violation of the Charter result-
ing from the embargo imposed on Burundi by the respondent states 
between 1996 and 1999, following the coup d'etat led by Major Pierre 
Buyoya in 1996. The resolution to impose an embargo on Burundi was 
I 13 See also CtJenwi (fn I I I aoove) 
) ) 4 Assocwtion pour la Sauvegarde de la Pair au Burundi v Kenya. Botswana. Tanzania. 
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taken at the Summit of the Great Lakes Region held in Tanzania to sanc-
tion the unconstitutional change of government in 1996 in Burundi. The 
Commission agreed to be seized of the communication at its 20th session 
in October 1996, but only decided on the merits of the case at its 33rd 
session in May 2003, long after the embargo was lifted in 1999, The 
Association pour la Sauvegarde de la Paix claimed that the embargo 
imposed on Burundi constituted a violation of articles 4, 17( I), 22 and 
23(2)(b) of the African Charter and articles 3( I), (2) and (3) of the OAU 
Charter.' The complainant sought reparation for the damages incurred 
due to the embargo, The communication was submitted before the adop-
tion of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Declaration on 
Unconstitutional Change of Government, but decided after their adoption, 
On the issue of locus standi, the Commission noted that 'the authors of 
the communication were in all respects representing the interests of the 
military regime of Burundi', which the Commission acknowledged was a 
clear indication that the 'communication appropriately falls under inter-
state communications (articles 47 to 54)" However, the Commission 
resolved £0 consider the communication under article 55 of the Charter 
for 'the interests of the advancement of human rights', The decision of the 
Commission to consider the communication as an individual complaint 
has been criticised because it seems to assume that inter-state complain-
ants constitute a less effective mechanism for the advancement of human 
rights, lib The Commission therefore declared the communication £0 be 
admissible on the basis of article 56(5), that no local remedies exist in 
Burundi because the national courts of Burundi have no jurisdiction over 
the respondent states, 
The Commission did not address individually each provision allegedly 
violated by the respondent states, Rather, it considered whether the 
imposition of the embargo on Burundi constituted a violation of the 
Charter. The Commission found that the embargo was imposed as a 
'collective action, , , to address a matter within the region that could 
constitute a threat to peace, stability and security',"7 Between 1975 and 
I 996, the six coups successfully perpetrated in Burundi aggravated the 
volatile situation in the region, The Commission did not consider the 
legality of the embargo according to the argument that undemocratic 
changes of governments constitute a massive violation of human rights, 
One could argue that, through this position, the Commission implicitly set, 
as a standard in the African system, that non-compliance with human rights 
1 15 An 4 of the African Charter on the right to life: an I 7( I) on the right to education and 
art 23(2)(b) on the prohibition to allow subversive and terrorist activities on one's lerri-
LOry, Art 3 of the OAll Charter on the prinCiple of non-interference in the imernal af-
fairs of Slates, 
116 See Olinga A 'The embargo against Burundi before the African Commission on human 
and peoples' rights (Note on communication 157/96, Associationfor the Preservation oj 
the Preservation oj Peace in Burundi v Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Zaire and Zam-
bIG)' (2005) 5 African Human Rights Law journal 424-432. 
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obligations does not justify the imposition of sanctions on states. The 
Commission rather based its enquiry on the argument that the embargo 
was imposed in reaction to a threat to peace, security and stability in the 
region, which is permitted under chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations. "" The Commission further found that 'no breach attaches to the 
procedure adopted by the states concerned' to impose the embargo.' 
The Commission was satisfied that there was no violation of the Charter. 
It did not deem it necessary to consider whether the respondent states 
had alternatives to the imposition of the embargo on Burundi. Neither did 
it address the question as to whether the imposition of the embargo was 
effective in realiSing the objective it sought to achieve. 
However, the Commission considered whether the embargo had ad-
verse effects on the rights of the complainant, in which case the action 
would have been illegitimate. In addition to the limits of economic sanc-
tions defined by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.'IO the Commission added that 
[sjanClions therefore cannot be open-ended, the effects thereof must be care-
fully monitored, measures must be adopted to meet the basic needs of the 
most vulnerable populatiOns or they must be targeted at the main perpetrators 
or authors of the nuisance complained of.'2' 
Based solely on the submissions of the respondent states, the Commission 
declared itself 'satisfied that the sanctions imposed were not indiscrimi-
nate, that they were targeted in that a list of affected goods was made'. W 
The Commission was also satisfied that a committee was put in place to 
monitor regularly the situation in Burundi. As a result, the Commission 
did not find any violation of the Charter. The conclusions the Commission 
arrived at were exclusively based on the submissions of the complainant 
and the reactions of the respondent states. The rights of the people on the 
ground could have been better protected if the Commission had conducted 
on-site investigations at the time of the event. The allegations of violations 
of article 23(2)(b) of the Charter also deserved an on-site investigation. 
This is even more important, taking into account the Commission's position 
that the Obligations of the state are not extinguished, although the situa-
tion had improved. '24 
I 18 An 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (adopted in 2000, entered inlo 
force in 2001) later provided thaI the Union can imerfere in the internal affairs of a 
member state in grave circumstances. 
I I 9 Association pour fa Sauvegarde case (fn 1 14 above) par 72. 
120 See General Comment 8 of the United Nations' Commitree on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: sanctions should be flexible, elTectively monitored and should not be 
excessive, disproportionate or indiscriminate and should not seek to achieve ends be-
yond their legitimate purpose, On this issue, rhe Commission wrongly quoted the Hu-
man Rights Committee. 
121 AssociatIOn p011r la Sauvegarde case (fn 114 above) par 75. 
122 Par 76. 
123 See Olinga (fn 116 above) 430. 
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7 A CONFUSING DECISION ON ADMISSIBILITY UNDER 
ARTICLE 56(7) OF THE AFRICAN CHARTER: INTERIGHTS (ON 
BEHALF OF PAN AFRICAN MOVEMENT AND CITIZENS FOR 
PEACE IN ERITREA) v ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA 125 
The war over boundaries between Ethiopia and Eritrea took place from 
May 1998 to June 2000. On 12 December 2000, the belligerents agreed to 
a comprehensive peace agreement and binding arbitration of their dis-
putes under the Algiers Agreement.
12o 
As part of the peace agreement, the 
Ethiopian-Eritrean Claims Commission was created between the two 
countries to address 'the negative socio-economic impact of the crisis on 
the civilian population, including the impact on those persons who have 
been deported'. 127 The body is bound by the peace agreement to apply the 
rules of international law. 
The two communications were consolidated and considered jointly by 
the Commission. They were submitted on behalf of the Ethiopians and 
Eritreans who suffered the consequences of the war between the two 
countries and, inter alia, the massive expulsions and detentions of civil-
ians from each country by the other and massive home-evictions. The 
Commission considered the question whether the communications should 
be considered as an inter-state complaint governed by articles 47-54, or 
as an individual complaint governed by articles 55-57. Both states pre-
ferred to maintain them under the procedures of article 55. The com-
plainant alleged violation of articles I, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7( I), 12( I), (2), (4) and 
(5), 14, 15, 16 and 18( I) of the African Charter.
128 
The Commission de-
clared the communications to be admissible under article 56(5), for non-
existence of domestic remedies available to the complainants, because of 
the massive nature of the violations.
129 
However, the Commission grappled with article 56(7) of the Charter in 
considering whether the case was already being considered by another 
international body, namely the Ethiopian-Eritrean Claims Commission, as 
contended by both parties. In reality, the Commission did not apply the 
provisions of article 56(7}, but, rather, decided that for practical reasons, 
the Ethiopian-Eritrean Claims Commission would be better suited to 
handle the matters raised by the complainant. Indeed, and referring to its 
decision in Embga Mekongo v Cameroon,130 it enunciated: 
125 Intenghts (on behalf of Pan African Movement and Citizens for Peace in Eritrea) v Ethiopia 
and Eritrea (2003) AHRLR 74 (ACHPR 2003). 
126 'Eritrean - Ethiopian war'. available at htlp:llen.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eritrean-Ethiopian_ 
War. 
127 Interights v Ethiopia and Eritrea case (fn 125 above) par 46. 
128 Art I on states' obligations under the African Charter; art 2 on the prohibition of 
discrimination; art 3 on the right to equality; art 12 on the freedom of movemenr and 
seeking of asylum; art 14 on the right to property; art 15 on the right to work; art 16 
on the right to health; art 18 on the right to family life. 
129 The Commission referred to its position in Rencontre Africaine Pour la Defense des 
Draits de ['Homme v Zambia (2000) AHRLR 32 1 (ACHRPR 1996). 
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In principle the appropriate remedy of those claims submitted to the Claims 
Commission should be monetary compensation. However. it is also within the 
Claims Commission's mandate to provide other types of remedies that are ac-
ceptable within international practice. It is probable that the African Commis-
sion will reach a decision finding the respondent states in violation of the rights 
of the individuals on whose behalf Interights is acting. However, as was the 
case in Mekongo v Cameroon, the African Commission would certainly be con-
strained in awarding compensation and may have to refer this matter to the 
Claims Commission and at which point the matter would certainly be time 
barred."! 
The Commission therefore declined to decide on the merits of the case. It 
misleadingly gave the impression that the communications could still be 
reconsidered by the Commission, should the Claims Commission not fully 
address the human rights violations alleged by the complainant in the 
communications. This is contrary to the provisions of article 56(7) of the 
African Charter, more so after the Commission noted that the Claims 
Commission is bound to apply international law in its proceedings. In the 
case of Njoku v Egypt,l32 the Commission held that communications are 
inadmissible under article 56(7) of the African Charter only if they 'have 
been settled' by another international body. ,33 One should therefore 
understand that the Commission will not consider the matter settled if the 
violations of human rights have not been fully addressed. However, the 
Commission is not equipped to assess whether the alleged human rights 
violations were effectively addressed. The hearings of the Claims Com-
mission are held in camera, unless the parties agree otherwise. 13' The 
Commission will rely exclusively on the submissions made to it by both 
respondent states on the process before the Claims Commission and on 
the decision of the Claims Commission, the respondent states would have 
submirted to it to assess whether the people who claim that their rights 
have been violated have been adequately compensated. 
8 CONCLUSION 
So far, the jurisprudence of the Commission has developed mostly 
through the individual complaint mechanism A wide array of rights, 
including the right to health, collective peace and security, and a challenge 
to the death penalty were dealt with by the Commission in 2003. The 
Commission used a broad interpretative approach to promote the aims 
and spirit of the African Charter which, in exceptional cases, led it to find 
violations beyond the allegations of the complainant. 135 However, the 
question of implementation and compliance with the Commission's 
decisions remains a major impediment to the Commission's fulfilment of 
131 lnlerighls v Ehiopia and Eritrea (fn 125 above) par 59. 
132 Njoku v Egypt (2000) AHRLR 83 (ACHPR 1997) 
133 Par 56. 
134 See an 13(5) of tile Rules of Procedure of the Claims Commission. available at 
hnp:llwww.pca-cpa.org/ENGLlSH/RPCIEECCIRules% 200f% 20Procedure. PDF. 










































COMMUNICATIONS Of THE AfRlCAN COMMISSION Of HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS 
its mandate. 13L Like a candle in the wind, the Commission is facing a mas-
sive challenge in developing a culture of human rights in Africa. However, 
it is certainly not fading before the backlog of communications and over-
whelming human rights violations on the continent. 
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